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Five Dragons Stirring Up the Sea
Challenge and Opportunity in China’s Improving Maritime
Enforcement Capabilities

I

n an age of delicate maneuvering among the great powers, coast guards have taken
new and leading roles on the world stage. When Washington wanted to demonstrate
conviction and bring supplies to beleaguered Georgia without escalating already simmering tensions around the Black Sea, the USCGC Dallas, a large U.S. Coast Guard
cutter, was quickly dispatched.1 The trend has long been visible in Asia. Tokyo’s most
extensive use of deadly force in the postwar era was an action by the Japanese coast
guard against a North Korean surveillance vessel.2 More recently, a Japan Coast Guard
cutter sank a Taiwanese fishing vessel in a collision near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyutai
Islands in the East China Sea, prompting a relatively serious diplomatic incident.3 These
most powerful coast guards are spawning imitators. India, for example, announced a
bold new purchase of long-range patrol aircraft for its coast guard in the fall of 2008.4
South Korea’s improving coast guard, meanwhile, has invited foreign reporters to a tour
in the vicinity of islands that are administered by South Korea but claimed by Japan,
accompanying the visit with belligerent rhetoric.5
In light of this background, but also of the wide consensus that the rise of China is one
of the most important phenomena for international security in the twenty-first century,
it is especially curious that almost nothing is known about the organization, capabilities,
service culture, or prospects of China’s coast guard. While the Japan Coast Guard has
appropriately drawn the recent attention of scholars in the field, China’s developments
in this regard have been neglected, despite the availability of ample source material in
Chinese.6 Notably, a leading expert on China’s “frontier defense” recently observed that
his own work “examines only China’s approach to securing its land borders. . . . Future
research should study China’s approach to maritime defense.”7 Of course, there has been
considerable scholarly attention to Chinese naval development, and this is wholly appropriate.8 Nevertheless, studies of Chinese naval development tend to focus on offshore
and high-intensity combat scenarios, including submarine operations and amphibious
exercises, as well as the potential future possibilities for extended sea-lane defense, power
projection, and nuclear deterrence. A widely noted incident in March 2009 involving
U.S. surveillance vessels and Chinese maritime enforcement vessels (alongside Chinese
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fishing boats) has also increased the salience of understanding China’s nonmilitary
maritime-enforcement capabilities.
In general, coastal-defense issues and, especially, questions related to so-called nontraditional security have not been adequately explored in the Chinese maritime context. If
Chinese perceptions with respect to coastal management and monitoring, port security,
piracy, narco-trafficking, environmental protection, and search and rescue continue to
be poorly understood outside of China, cooperation among the maritime powers of East
Asia may well remain underdeveloped as well.9 The unprecedented December 2008 deployment of the Chinese navy to join other navies in the Gulf of Aden in counterpiracy
operations is unquestionably a major step in the right direction. But much more can
and should be done to find common ground with China in countering nontraditional
threats.
Today, China remains relatively weak in the crucially important middle domain of
maritime power, that between commercial prowess and hard military power, which is
concerned with maritime governance—enforcing a nation’s own laws and ensuring
“good order” off its coasts.10 Despite major improvements over the last decade, China’s
maritime enforcement authorities remain balkanized and relatively weak—described in
a derogatory fashion by many Chinese experts as so many “dragons stirring up the sea.”11
In Northeast Asia, China’s weak maritime enforcement capacities are the exception,
especially when compared to the coast guard capacities of Japan (or, outside the region,
of the United States). Indeed, Japan’s coast guard was recently described as almost, if not
quite, a second navy for Tokyo.12
China’s relative weakness in this area is a mystery, one that forms the central research
question of the present study. This condition of relative weakness is outlined in the
paper’s first part. The second part describes and analyzes the current situation of each
of the five most important bureaucratic agencies responsible for maritime enforcement
and governance in China today. The third part of this paper raises the question of what
relationships these entities, and any future unified Chinese coast guard, would have with
the Chinese navy. Before turning to implications and prospects, the fourth delves into a
variety of macroexplanations for the weakness of China’s coast guard entities today. Part
five analyzes the possibilities for future maritime security cooperation, by looking closely
at U.S.-China civil maritime engagement between coast guard entities over the last
decade. The final part elaborates on three possible strategic implications of enhanced
Chinese coast guard capabilities. This study, as a whole, draws on hundreds of Chineselanguage sources, interviews in China, and, especially, a highly detailed and remarkably
candid 2007 survey by Professor He Zhonglong and three other faculty members at the
Border Guards Maritime Police Academy in Ningbo.13
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The continuing evolution of Chinese coast guard entities into more coherent and effective agents of maritime governance presents both a challenge and an opportunity for
security and stability in East Asia. Enlarged capacities will naturally result in more stringent enforcement of China’s maritime claims vis-à-vis its many neighbors.14 However,
a more benign potential result is that enhanced Chinese capacities in maritime governance may result in greater willingness by Beijing to support global maritime safety and
security norms as a full-fledged and vital “maritime stakeholder.”

Relative Weakness in a Strong Neighborhood
The weaknesses in China’s coast guard capacities are amply evident to Chinese maritime analysts. They view these capacities as disproportionately small, given the scale of
China’s maritime development. He Zhonglong and his colleagues write: “Our current
maritime law enforcement forces . . . are not commensurate with our status and image as
a great power.”15 He and his coauthors elaborate: “Currently, among maritime enforcement ships, the vast majority consists of small patrol boats of less than 500 tons, and the
number of ship-borne helicopters is such that these forces cannot meet the requirements
of comprehensive maritime law enforcement.”16 The Ningbo Maritime Police Academy
faculty assert that the present situation is intolerable: “China is a country with a large
population, and its land-based resources are insufficient. The oceans can replace and
supplement for land space and with respect to resources have enormous latent capacity
and strategic significance.”17
By contrast, other Pacific powers, and especially the United States and Japan, wield
tremendously strong and effective coast guards. This unfavorable comparison is well
documented and understood among Chinese maritime analysts.18 Indeed, the level of
detailed understanding in China of American and Japanese coast guard capacities is
impressive, suggestive simultaneously of envy and admiration.19 Illustrating the relative weakness of Chinese coast guard capacity, He Zhonglong, for instance, notes that
the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) is equipped with 250 aircraft of different types, while the
Japanese coast guard has seventy-five. Chinese coast guard entities, with much less developed aviation forces, probably field fewer than three dozen aircraft of all types.20 Aircraft
are crucial for both long-range patrol, on the one hand, and complicated rescues, on the
other. Moreover, the professional requirements for a nation’s coast guard to maintain a
strong aviation component are considerable. Therefore, these numbers are reflective of
the very large gap that separates China from these other major Pacific coast guard forces,
a fact duly noted by the Ningbo Academy study.21 Table 1 illustrates that although coast
guard entities of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have relatively many small and
very small patrol vessels (under 1,500 tons), Beijing is well behind both Washington
and Tokyo in numbers of medium-sized (1,500–3,000 tons) and large (over 3,500 tons)
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cutters.22 The Ningbo Academy study additionally points out that the Republic of Korea
(ROK) undertook in 1996 a successful unification of disparate maritime enforcement
elements into a single, powerful Korea Coast Guard, modeled on the American and
Japanese paradigms.23
Table 1. Pacific Coast Guards Compared
Source: He Zhonglong et al., Research on the Building of the Chinese Coast Guard, pp. 142–43.

Country

South Korea

Japan

USA

18,000

11,542

30,000

160,550

8

5

11

12

19

9

37

32

Small cutters
(500 tons+)

149

66

82

44

Small boats
(100 tons+)

304

111

107

258

Length of coastline (km)
Large cutters
(3,500 tons+)
Midsize cutters
(1,500 tons+)

China

Beijing’s impulse to upgrade its coast guard capabilities is clearly related to its overall
strategic goal of increasing its maritime capabilities more generally and is thus quite
consistent with China’s rapid naval development. Indeed, the implications of this initiative for East Asian security are considerable and will be analyzed at the conclusion of
this study. The tone of the Ningbo Academy analysis certainly does suggest the significance of the national security factor in Chinese thinking about maritime enforcement
capabilities. Its authors observe, for example, that “today, cold war thinking still exists
in many countries. . . . [T]here are hostile attitudes.”24 Regarding the delicate issue of
sovereignty in the South China Sea, the same analysis notes: “On the one hand, China
and the ten states of ASEAN signed the code of conduct with respect to the South Sea
in Phnom Penh, [but] to some degree, what has happened is that China’s sovereignty
and interests continue to be seriously encroached upon.”25 This motive is not surprising
and is consistent with strong nationalism extant among Chinese intellectuals and policy
analysts more generally.
However, another strong current is evident in China’s buildup of coast guard capacities,
one that is quite cognizant of globalization and the growing interdependence among
nations. In this current of thinking, also amply evident in the Ningbo Academy analysis,
can be found the quite sophisticated and encouraging notion that strong coast guards
might, by their versatile nature, actually serve as cushions between navies, helping to
mitigate the possibility of interstate conflict in East Asia. Along these lines, it is reassuring that He Zhonglong and his coauthors conclude, “Everyone lives together on one
planet, and are confronted by common threats, and have common interests.”26 Another
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analysis likewise notes that international relationships built with other coast guards have
“many time[s] succeeded in foiling transnational criminal activity.”27 The study by the
Ningbo Academy faculty ultimately pinpoints the organizational factor in explaining
weakness in Chinese maritime enforcement capacity. As its coauthors write,
The organizational set up of China’s maritime governance is not ideal. For a long time,
there has been the situation of “a group of dragons stirring up the sea”: in every situation
there are multiple agencies involved, each with their own competence and scope of jurisdiction overlapping, as well as glaring gaps. Internally, this creates problems with respect
to consistent enforcement, while externally there is no unity of effort. The result is a situation of a passive, weak, and ineffective force.28

While this explanation in itself is quite persuasive, this analysis will evaluate some other
potential causes of this weakness as well, in addition to evaluating prospects for reform,
the potential for developing further international cooperation in maritime security, and
the attendant strategic implications for East Asian security.

China’s Five Maritime Enforcement Dragons
Altogether, China’s “five dragons stirring up the sea”—that is, the five agencies that
constitute the nation’s maritime enforcement capabilities—amount to roughly forty
thousand personnel, according to the analysis by Ningbo Academy.29
Table 2. Planning Requirement for Chinese Maritime Enforcement Vessels
Source: He Zhonglong et al., Research on the Building of the Chinese Coast Guard, p. 142.

East China
Sea

Yellow
Sea

Bohai
Gulf

South China
Sea

Total

—

4

—

—

4

8

2

6

5

1

5

19

Small cutters
(500 tons+)

20

30

30

26

43

149

Small boats
(100 tons+)

26

95

80

304

Tonkin
Gulf
Large cutters
(3,500 tons+)
Midsize cutters
(1,500 tons+)

103

The following section briefly describes the organization, missions, and capabilities of
each of the “dragons.” However, it should be noted that while the Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) is remarkably transparent, the other, smaller organizations are less
accessible and therefore less well understood.
The Maritime Police of the Border Control Department (BCD)
The China Maritime Police (公安边防海警部门) is a part of the Border Control
Department, which is an elite subcomponent of the People’s Armed Police, under the
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Ministry of Public Security. This pattern is likely derived from the Soviet model, which
also designated border guards as a separate and elite formation. The China Maritime
Police operate speedboats and small cutters generally. These craft are often armed with
machine guns or small cannons. It is worth emphasizing that this force is armed, because
several of the other important dragons are unarmed, raising a host of complications.
A current workhorse of the Maritime Police fleet is the Seal (海豹) HP1500-2, a highspeed patrol craft. These small vessels are capable of fifty-two knots, have a range of 250
km, and require a crew of six to eight personnel. Their intended missions include escort,
on-the-water marine inspections, and search and rescue. The new standard small cutter
for the Maritime Police is the Type 218. This design is forty-one meters in length; has
a beam of 6.2 meters; displaces 130 tons; develops a top speed of twenty-nine knots;
carries a crew of twenty-three; and mounts a single, 14.5 mm machine gun. A large Type
718 patrol cutter for the Maritime Police was apparently launched in 2006. It displaces
1,500 tons, and has a length of one hundred meters, a helicopter landing platform, and a
37 mm cannon. The Maritime Police also recently took possession of two older People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) Navy Jianghu frigates, after they had been overhauled and
renamed Haijing (海警)1002 and Haijing (海警)1003. At this time, the Maritime Police
has no aviation assets.30
Photo 1. This 1,000-ton Type 718 cutter, Haijing 1001, serves with the China Coast Guard of
the Ministry of Public Security. This ship, launched in 2006, has a single 37 mm deck gun. This
is the China Coast Guard’s most modern vessel. (China Defense Forum)
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Photo 2. Haijing 1002 is one of two new China Coast Guard cutters that were transferred to
the Public Security Ministry from the PLA Navy. They were formerly Jianghu-class missile
frigates. China Maritime Surveillance is another civil maritime agency that has received ships
from the PLA Navy. (China Defense Forum)

The main training academy for the maritime police is in Ningbo. However, not all the
students at the Ningbo Academy are maritime police; its students receive a generalized
border-guard curriculum in their first years and apparently can opt into the maritime
specialty about halfway through the program. Training facilities at the Ningbo Academy are impressive, especially the engineering and shiphandling simulators, which use
advanced software to create a
Photo 3. A small patrol boat in service with the China
Coast Guard. Chinese civil maritime authorities have
high degree of fidelity compalacked for an adequate motor surfboat for rescue
rable to simulators in use in the
operations and have apparently considered purchases
from abroad to fill this requirement. (China Defense Forum)
West.
The primary mission of the
Maritime Police is crime
fighting, but emergent threats
of special concern include
terrorism and piracy. Although
no cases of maritime terrorism have been reported in or
against China, fears have been
heightened by the 9/11 attacks
against the United States, continued unrest among certain minority populations in
China that have resorted to terrorist tactics, and a naturally heightened consciousness
resulting from the Olympic Games in Beijing. During the games the Maritime Police apparently sortied thirty ships each day and stopped or detained over a thousand vessels.31
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Photo 4. Ministry of Public Security forces on a China Coast Guard cutter participate in a drill.
Most of China’s other civil maritime agencies are unarmed. This has caused some consternation,
for example, when Fisheries Law Enforcement Command vessels are lacking deterrence or
enforcement capabilities. (China Defense Forum)

On the theme of vulnerability along the coasts, He Zhonglong and his coauthors write,
“Our country’s cities of Hong Kong, Macau, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and such important
cities along the coast . . . could become the major targets of surprise attack by international terrorists.”32 Another China naval affairs analyst observes with similar concern
that “armed groups from the Middle East are becoming more and more interested in
maritime, surprise terrorist attacks.”33 Indeed, Chinese military and naval analysts have
been keen to learn any lessons that have emerged from the November 2008 terrorist attacks against Mumbai, which involved insertions by boat.
China’s maritime history is replete with difficulties arising from piracy, so it is perhaps
not surprising to see great interest in the subject as reflected in Chinese maritime
publications.34
Moreover, it is certainly noteworthy that the impetus for the December 2008 counterpiracy deployment of a Chinese naval task force to the Gulf of Aden seems to have
originated in part within China’s civil maritime sector.35 Indeed, piracy has long been a
major concern among Chinese maritime analysts. One article on the issue emphasizes
the proximity of the problem: “Of the 124 incidents of piracy in 2005, 60% occurred in
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Asia’s South Sea triangle [in approximately the area of the South China Sea].”36 Another
Chinese analysis of the piracy issue concludes, “The pirates have lots of modern weapons, are equipped with advanced communications equipment, and have secret links with
international criminal gangs and even terrorist organizations.”37 Yet another source observes that Chinese vessels in distant waters have also been victimized by pirates.38 Thus,
it would not be surprising to see various Chinese maritime enforcement elements active
in future operations against pirates, perhaps acting in tandem with the PLA Navy.
As the primary armed element among China’s maritime enforcement dragons, the
BCD—frequently referred to as the “China Coast Guard”—might well be expected to
take the lead in confronting such challenges. At present, according to the Ningbo Academy study, the BCD has ten thousand personnel—about a quarter of the total of the five
dragons.39 It is also noteworthy that the BCD has been designated as the “lead dragon” in
liaison and exchanges with the U.S. Coast Guard—a relationship discussed at length in
the fifth part of this study.
The Maritime Safety Administration
The only dragon that competes in power and prestige with the BCD is the Maritime
Safety Administration of the Chinese Ministry of Transportation (交通部下属的海
事局及救打捞局). In terms of manpower, the MSA has twice as many personnel as
the BCD—about twenty thousand—approximately half of the aggregate of the five
maritime enforcement agencies. MSA missions include inspection and registration of
Chinese and foreign vessels in Chinese ports, investigation of maritime accidents, the
training and certifying of seafarers, supervision of marine traffic control, maintenance
of aids to navigation, implementation of domestic and international maritime laws,
and maritime search and rescue. There are fourteen regional MSA offices, mainly in
the coastal provinces but also at some inland river transport centers, such as along the
Yangtze River. Each MSA regional office has a rescue coordination center, and several in
coastal provinces have a variety of rescue subcenters.40
The author was fortunate enough to visit the Shanghai Rescue Coordination Center
(RCC) in November 2007. As befits one of the world’s busiest ports, the Shanghai RCC is
equipped with modern and fairly well integrated ship-management systems. The Shanghai Port relies on at least eleven major radar stations and two vessel tracking centers in
addition to the RCC.41 These systems are supplemented by the Automatic Identification
System (AIS), which, per regulations of the International Maritime Organization, requires vessels of over three hundred tons to report automatically their positions, courses,
and speeds in real time.42 Such systems have revolutionized ship traffic control and dramatically enhanced maritime domain awareness on all the world’s oceans but especially
along the Chinese coast; a major push has been made to set up AIS receiver/tracking
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stations along the entire length of that busy shipping route.43 A further vessel tracking method employed by Chinese authorities is the China Ship Reporting (CHISREP)
system. It requires Chinese-flag vessels to report their positions regularly to a coordination center. Somewhat analogous to the U.S. Coast Guard’s Amver (Automated MutualAssistance Vessel Rescue) system, which serves as a clearinghouse for merchant vessel
positions on a global scale, CHISREP has most obvious significance in the domain of
search and rescue, though other applications—for example, pollution control—are quite
conceivable. Another important technology on display at the Shanghai RCC during the
author’s visit was extensive closed-circuit-TV coverage of the port area of the Huangpu
River, no doubt improving port management, safety, and security.
Despite this wide variety of mutually reinforcing systems, however, some problems
seemed evident, especially in the realm of coordination. For example, Shanghai RCC
personnel conceded that while their display screens could easily plot the positions of
local MSA assets, they could not readily display those of BCD/China Coast Guard vessels
in the same area.
The MSA’s important position among China’s maritime enforcement dragons is confirmed by evident investments in capital stock—new ships and aircraft. (It is worth emphasizing here that MSA cutters are unarmed—a clear distinction from the USCG and
other coast guards around the world.) The launching of the fairly large cutter Haixun 31
(three thousand tons) in 2004 seems to have heralded a turn toward oceangoing rescue
vessels. Though the ship reportedly had problems, particularly with communications
equipment, it was noteworthy not only for its size but also as the first MSA vessel to
carry an embarked helicopter.44 A June 2008 deployment of the vessel to patrol China’s
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the East China Sea was covered widely in the Western
press.45 Two successor ships are Haixun 21 and Haixun 11, the latter of which was commissioned in September 2009 and similarly displaces three thousand tons. It appears that
Haixun 11 will be homeported at Weihai, in Shandong Province.46
Three additional big, new cutters have been commissioned by the MSA, including
Nanhaijiu 101, Nanhaijiu 112, and Beijhaijiu 111. These very large vessels—Nanhaijiu
101 is listed at 6,257 tons, and all are equipped to carry helicopters—feature a dramatic
departure in design from Haixun 31. With their very prominent forecastles and superstructures and their extremely low aft decks, they resemble massive tugboats more than
their actual equivalents in, for example, the Japanese coast guard. They appear to be
equipped with very modern features, including, for example, variable-pitch propellers,
which greatly enhance the maneuverability of large vessels. Current MSA doctrine keeps
most ships at sea for two weeks, followed by just one day in port to resupply before
resuming station. There are apparently two crews per vessel, each crew working two
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Photo 5. The large cutter Haixun 11 of the MSA was commissioned in September 2009 in
Qingdao. In terms of resources and personnel, the MSA, which is part of the Transportation
Ministry, appears to be the most influential among China’s civil maritime agencies. (China
Defense Forum)

continuous months on board, then one month ashore. Crew members are thus at sea
about eight months per year.47
With respect to smaller vessels, another innovative design is featured in the recently
launched Beihaijiu 201. This small cutter is a high-speed catamaran, modeled on recent
Photo 6. This catamaran, Donghai Jiu 201,
commercial ferry designs.48 The MSA has
serves with the Rescue and Salvage Bureau
notably lacked small motor surfboats and
of the China Maritime Safety Administration.
may have recently purchased some from the
Catamarans are in wide use now as ferries
and also with the PLA Navy. (China Defense
United Kingdom.49 However, attention to
Forum)
smaller cutters is evident in the 2008 launch
at Wuhan of a new forty-meter design, optimized for Yangtze River rescue operations.50
Progress in airborne rescue assets has been
slower. Certainly, Chinese maritime analysts
appreciate the crucial role of helicopters
for contemporary coast guard duties.51 The
coauthors of the Ningbo Academy study, for
example, conclude, “A helicopter operating
from a mother ship has enormous value
. . . especially in conducting enforcement
[operations] in blue water.”52 Nevertheless,
airborne search and rescue capabilities are
being built essentially from scratch. Though
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a series of MSA flight bases were established in 2004, the service does not appear to
currently operate many more than a dozen aircraft.53 Interestingly, the MSA already has
a number of Sikorsky helicopters. Some helicopter rescues have reportedly occurred,
but night operations are restricted. According to MSA personnel, the biggest bottleneck
preventing a major expansion of the MSA flying service is training, of both pilots and
rescue swimmers. In both these areas, China has made ambitious proposals involving
assistance from the U.S. Coast Guard, but the USCG has been unable to respond so far.
To date, PRC coast guard entities have benefited substantially from training assistance by
Hong Kong’s capable airborne patrol and rescue service. According to an MSA plan announced in early 2003, the goal is to achieve effective search and rescue within fifty miles
of the coast with a reaction time of 150 minutes; by 2020 this time is to be improved to
less than ninety minutes. The range for search and rescue operations is also to be gradually expanded to cover China’s entire exclusive economic zone.54
China’s maritime rescue service has come a long way in a short time. In 1999, the MSA
was faced with a Titanic-like tragedy when the ferry Dashun went down in bad weather
just a few miles offshore in the Yellow Sea. Out of 304 passengers and crew, there were
just twenty-two survivors.55 The accident, a major national tragedy, helped to galvanize
efforts to establish a much more vigorous maritime rescue service. As Captain Bernard
Photo 7. Search and rescue is a major mission of the MSA and aviation assets are now a
development priority for MSA and Chinese civil maritime agencies more generally. However,
deck aviation is still a relatively new concept for Chinese civil maritime authorities. (China
Defense Forum)
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Moreland, USCG, as a liaison officer at the U.S. embassy in Beijing,
wrote in 2007, “Less than 10 years
after the Dashun tragedy, China
has a fully operating professional
maritime search and rescue capacity.”56 Indeed, MSA can point to
some concrete achievements, such
as reductions over the course of a
ten-year plan of maritime accidents
by a third and maritime accident
fatalities by a quarter. A new rescue
network was established along the
Yangtze River in 2001.57 During
2002–2003, the MSA conducted 520
rescue missions, involving 1,303 ship
sorties and 25 aircraft sorties; of 14,901 persons in danger, 13,997 were saved, including
787 foreign nationals.58
Photo 8. A heliborne rescue undertaken by the
Maritime Safety Administration. China began to use
helicopters in civil maritime rescue operations in
2006. (China Defense Forum)

A key enabler of enhanced professionalism in China’s MSA is its high-quality professional journal, 中国海事 (China Maritime Affairs). Of particular note in this journal is
the frequent and serious use of the case-study method: accidents are described, dissected, and mined for lessons that can inform future practice.59 Nor do these cases describe
accidents only in Chinese waters; they examine related incidents around the world,
such as the recent sinking of an Egyptian ferry in the Red Sea with great loss of life.60
Additionally, a major emphasis in this journal is on learning from the experiences and
procedures of maritime safety and security in other nations.61
Other common themes in China Maritime Affairs include recently promulgated laws,
issues related to toxic spills, typhoon emergency response, newly available technologies, and profiles of service practice in foreign countries.62 Regarding typhoon response,
China has received high marks in recent years for diligent preparedness and execution
of emergency plans for dangerous coastal storms.63 The MSA has played a leading role
in establishing Chinese readiness for the cleanup of oil spills. In September 2008 it was
announced that China was signing an agreement on mutual support for oil-spill cleanup
with Japan, Russia, and South Korea.64 This agreement followed a December 2007 incident in which the Hong Kong oil tanker Hebei Spirit was involved in a major spill off the
Korean coastline; Beijing’s Ministry of Transportation dispatched two vessels to assist in
the cleanup.65
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Unlike the BCD, the Maritime Safety Administration does not have a formal academy.
The main maritime universities in Dalian, Shanghai, and Xiamen are apparently feeders
for MSA recruiting. Compared to equivalent American schools, such as King’s Point and
the Maine Maritime Academy, these Chinese maritime academic centers seem impressive.66
The Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (FLEC)
As have fisheries all over the globe, the Chinese fishing industry has been plagued in
the last decade by the environmental devastation wrought by overfishing. While growth
in aquaculture has mitigated this crisis to some extent, fishermen all along the Chinese
coast have experienced a difficult transition. As one Chinese study recently opined, “The
fact is obvious that the development of our nation’s fishing industry has reached an extremely important juncture. Most—if not all—of the fisheries have been fully exploited,
and many are already exhausted.”67 Another published study further reveals the scope of
the problem. Since the 1960s, fish species in the Beibu Gulf area of the South China Sea
have declined from 487 to 238. Stock density reached its lowest level in 1998, at just 16.7
percent of that of 1962; fish stocks have recovered somewhat since.68
Photo 9. FLEC cutter 44183 on patrol. Compared to other maritime enforcement agencies the
fisheries enforcement command has not received equivalent resources, at least to this point, and
may also be significantly undermanned. The large poster on the ship reads, “Protect National
Fisheries Resources.” As for many countries, fisheries conservation efforts have proved to be an
extremely challenging task for the Chinese government. (China Defense Forum)
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Photo 10. A Chinese FLEC officer, in cooperation with the U.S. Coast Guard, seized a Chinese
fishing vessel suspected of illegal large-scale high-seas drift net fishing in the North Pacific, on
September 12, 2008. (USCG Official Photo)

Such conditions have increased pressure on fisheries enforcement institutions and personnel, because of the imperative to enforce new regulations strictly in order to replenish fish stocks. A “zero growth” plan for the fishing fleet was initiated in 1999. By 2004,
eight thousand fishing vessels had been scrapped, and there is an effort to bring China’s
total fishing fleet down to 192,000 vessels by 2010. Summer moratoriums now exist for
almost all of China’s coastal areas.69 The task is made even more complicated by the
extensive overlapping of exclusive economic zones in the western Pacific, not to mention
the wide-ranging migratory patterns of regional fish stocks.
With a total haul of seventeen million tons in 2007, China’s fishing take is four times that
of the nearest competitor.70 Official figures suggest that China currently has approximately eight million fishermen. Among finfish, Chinese are largely catching anchovy,
Japanese scad, hairtail, and small yellow croaker; nets, line and hooks, and purse seines
are used. The East China Sea accounts for the largest catch, followed by the South China
Sea, then the Yellow Sea. Of these, only the South China Sea has seen increasing catches
of late. China’s marine fisheries and related industries are ranked as the largest sector of
the nation’s major marine industries. Guangdong and Shandong are the leading provinces, as measured by fishing output; Fujian and Zhejiang are close behind.71
China’s Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (农业部下属的渔政部门), part of the
Ministry of Agriculture, apparently has just a thousand personnel.72 The strategic implications of the state of China’s fisheries enforcement capabilities were suggested in early
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2009, when Chinese fishing or fisheries vessels were involved in a variety of international
incidents with regional neighbors and the United States.73 Hints of ineffectiveness and
inefficiency are revealed by the Ningbo Academy study, which cites fisheries enforcement
as an example of confusion among the five dragons. There is, Professor He Zhonglong
and his colleagues assert,
the “got jurisdiction, but cannot find, or can find, but do not have jurisdiction” phenomenon. . . . The fisheries enforcement department has the function of escorting fishing
vessels, but because they are unarmed, they lack enforcement deterrence and coercion
capabilities, and thus have trouble dealing with situations that suddenly arise. . . .
The public security maritime police, though having the police function, and being
equipped with all types of weaponry, possessing an advantage in any circumstances involving escort of fishing vessels, because of limitations on jurisdiction can only play a supporting role, and are in an awkward position. The country’s maritime rights and interests, as
well as the national honor, are difficult to protect in such circumstances.74

Also important is that in addition to policies encouraging aquaculture, Beijing has in
recent years pushed to develop a long-distance fishing fleet. By 2006, this fleet had grown
to almost two thousand vessels and was operating on the high seas and in the EEZs of
thirty-five countries.75 The Ningbo Academy study, for example, mentions this development, asserting, “If our country seeks to resolve the food question internally, then it is
necessary to exploit the sea’s bounty, through . . . developing the deep sea fishing industry.”76 Chinese fishing vessels are now a common sight in the waters of Africa and Latin
America, for example, a phenomenon that has brought about considerable controversy.
From the Chinese perspective, there has been some question as to how Chinese fishermen can be protected—against, for example, pirate attack—in such distant locations.77
This question in turn invites maritime analysts to consider whether Chinese maritime
enforcement capabilities will expand to a global presence commensurate with the nation’s global maritime commercial interests and how, if so, that would mesh with China’s
emerging naval strategy, which has already embraced the counterpiracy mission. An
even more sensitive question arises regarding fishing practice proximate to Chinese
waters. As stocks have declined around the region, a sense of fisheries nationalism has
grown. Indeed, a recent Chinese fisheries analysis concludes, “Although our country
has signed one after another fishing agreements with neighboring states, the number of
fishing industry security incidents involving foreigners has unceasingly increased. . . .
Some [countries] even send warships to bump and sink our side’s fishing boats.”78 Tensions flared in the summer of 2009 as Chinese maritime enforcement agencies patrolled
against foreign violators of strict new fishing regulations in the sensitive South China Sea.79
If, as has been suggested recently, a major buildup is under way of large, helicopter-capable
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cutters for the South China Sea component of the FLEC, Beijing’s fishing policies in the
region could well become more assertive.80
General Administration of Customs (GAC)
China’s status as an international trade juggernaut raises commensurately the prestige
of the General Administration of Customs. Indeed, before the establishment of the PRC,
China’s customs service (managed to a large extent by foreigners) virtually controlled
the state’s foreign policy. The vast amount of international commerce taking place in
China’s ports and on its coastal waters preordains the importance of the role of customs
in maritime enforcement (海关总署下属的缉私部门). Among the chief missions of
China customs are compilation of foreign trade statistics, revenue collection, customs
control (declarations, etc.), countersmuggling, and port control.81 The latter two missions are most relevant to maritime enforcement capabilities.
Photo 11. China’s Customs Agency operates a fleet of small cutters that focuses on maritime
anti-smuggling operations. (China Defense Forum)

According to the China Customs 2007 annual report, the GAC represents “the competent antismuggling authority of the Chinese government, which takes up most, if not
all, of the responsibility for combating smuggling.”82 The significant smuggling cases
prosecuted by the GAC in 2007 were reported to number 1,190, involving more than
US$1 billion, up 4.3 percent from the previous year. Among these cases were some 356
major drug busts, which netted almost five hundred kilograms of assorted illegal drugs.83
It is not clear what percentage of these interdiction activities occurred in the maritime
sphere, but some preliminary evidence suggests that a portion of China’s drug trade
does take place in seaborne vessels. Thus a 2007 article in the journal of the Fujian Police
Senior Academy Journal suggested, “In the last few years, criminals with drugs passing
through the port of Xiamen’s water transport routes have been using fishing vessels to
smuggle drugs.”84 Similar concerns about maritime drug enforcement have been noted
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in Chinese naval publications.85 The Ningbo Academy study also asserts the importance
of the antidrug mission for the future development of China’s maritime enforcement
capabilities.86 This is perhaps not surprising, as China customs has been working in
coordination with the Ministry of Public Security to form “joint anti-smuggling forces”
since 1998.87
China customs also plays a leading role in Chinese port management. The GAC is
proud that “ocean going imports and exports can usually be released within 24 hours.”88
China’s ambitious “E-port” initiative, outlined by the State Council in 2006, aims to
smooth out port operations by harnessing information technology—for example, by
allowing online payment of taxes and various charges. China customs holds the vice
chairmanship of the National E-Port Steering Committee, which also has representatives
from the other maritime enforcement dragons, including the BCD and the MSA.
According to the Ningbo Academy study, GAC maritime enforcement personnel number
about two thousand. Thus the GAC constitutes one of the smallest dragons, measured
by manpower. Interestingly, a June article in a Chinese military newspaper suggested that
the GAC has up to 212 fast patrol boats to employ against smugglers, but this figure has
been difficult to verify.89 The 2007 annual report makes note of a recent salary reform,
new uniforms, and the establishment of a new institute in Shanghai dedicated to customs issues.
The State Oceanographic Administration (SOA)
With an estimated six to eight thousand personnel, the State Oceanographic Administration—specifically, its China Maritime Surveillance (海洋局下属的中国海监), or
CMS—constitutes a maritime enforcement dragon of medium size, between the large
MSA and the much smaller customs and fisheries enforcement agencies.90 Major missions for the SOA include environmental protection, scientific research, and enforcement of EEZ rights and interests.
The rising profile of environmental protection in China has increased attention on
coastal environmental issues. The SOA has played an important role in recognizing the
extent of current problems. In 2006, a major SOA study concluded that “China faces
severe ocean pollution.”91 Some limited progress is already evident—for example, in
efforts to set up a comprehensive coastal environmental monitoring system, an initiative to increase compliance among coastal polluters, and a new network of 149 marine
protected areas.92 The 2008 Beijing Olympics seem also to have spurred new interest in
improving coastal water quality—in particular, in conjunction with the sailing events at
Qingdao; SOA research centers were active in monitoring and forecasting water quality
for that prestigious event.93 Along with curbing the runoff of pollutants discharged from
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factories on land, another major concern is coping with spills of oil and other toxic substances, which are carried in Chinese waters in huge quantities.
Corresponding with its mission to patrol China’s EEZ, the SOA has a relatively extensive
fleet of ships and aircraft. In 2006, it was reported that the SOA itself had twenty-one
ships, each displacing between a thousand and four thousand tons.94 A recent report on
the SOA’s South China Sea flotilla suggested that this division had eleven ships, six of
which reportedly are over a thousand tons in displacement. This South China Sea division of the SOA is said to be equipped with one helicopter and two fixed-wing aircraft.95
A 2008 report said that the CMS had a total of nine aircraft and more than two hundred
patrol vessels.96 Of late, the SOA has received at least three large new cutters, including
Haijian 46, Haijian 51, and Haijian 83. According to a 2009 report, the latter is the SOA’s
Photo 12. Haijian 83 is the largest and most advanced cutter of the CMS. The launch of several
new cutters for the CMS over the last decade suggests that the CMS has a certain priority among
China’s maritime enforcement agencies. (China Defense Forum)

largest cutter, at ninety-eight meters; this 3,400-ton vessel, built at Jiangnan shipyard, is
said to have cost about US$22 million and is assigned a helicopter.97
Though the MSA operates some aircraft for search and rescue purposes, the SOA’s allotment of aircraft clearly separates it from the other large dragon, the BCD (i.e., the
China Coast Guard), which has no aircraft. However, like the BCD, the SOA has recently
taken over some retired Chinese navy vessels.98 Reportedly, Haijian 20 and Haijian 32,
which will patrol in the Bohai Sea, are converted PLA Navy subchasers.99 With respect to
the SOA’s mission of patrolling China’s EEZ, the Ningbo Academy study states bluntly
that the agency falls short of requirements: “At this point, maritime enforcement patrol
ships are only sufficient to patrol territorial and adjoining sea areas with any frequency,
and cannot be responsible for missions within the EEZs or continental shelf areas.”100
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Photo 13. A helicopter operated by China Maritime Surveillance.
This is a type Z-9 design that is used widely among China’s armed
forces. (China Defense Forum)

According to another
report, the SOA was
directed by China’s
State Council to initiate patrols of the East
China Sea in 2006.
This elevated surveillance activity apparently involved daily
patrols by four aircraft
and six ships, operated by the SOA.101 A
2009 report suggests
that the CMS initiated
regular patrols of the southern part of the South China Sea in 2007.102 In aggregate, the
CMS reported, in the period 2001–2007, fifteen thousand instances of illegal activities
were detected in China’s EEZ, of which about ten thousand were apparently prosecuted.
According to one 2006 report, the SOA is already closely collaborating with the China
BCD in the Gulf of Tonkin (Beibu Wan) area and is looking to do so elsewhere as well.103
SOA sources candidly describe close coordination with the Chinese military.104 Indeed,
during a public statement in October 2008, CMS deputy director Sun Shuxian declared
that “the [CMS] force will be upgraded to a reserve unit under the navy, a move which
will make it better armed during patrols. . . . [T]he current defensive strength of CMS is
inadequate.”105 A similar message emerges from a September 2009 Chinese report that
documented multiple interactions between the SOA and American surveillance vessels.

Photo 14. A Y-12 aircraft of the CMS. It seems China’s civil maritime agencies are generally
lacking in sufficient numbers of fixed-wing aircraft, inhibiting long-range search and rescue
operations, for example. That the CMS operates fixed-wing aircraft is again symbolic of the
priority that the CMS enjoys among the civil maritime authorities. (China Defense Forum)
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This report suggested that SOA vessels required better sensors and electronic warfare
technology to cope with U.S. military surveillance craft.106
In addition, the SOA is leading China’s oceanographic research effort. According to the
official SOA website, the agency has no fewer than sixteen discrete research centers and
institutes. The agency is a major funder of research projects at China Ocean University
in Qingdao and likely many other university centers as well. In 2005, a SOA research
vessel capable of drilling cores from the sea bottom at depths in excess of three thousand
meters circumnavigated the globe to advance China’s oceanographic research across the
world’s oceans. The SOA has also launched a series of maritime observation satellites.
China’s recent mission to Antarctica to establish its third base there was organized by the
SOA, demonstrating the ambitious research agenda that the agency pursues.107

The Sixth and Mightiest Dragon? The Chinese Coast Guard and the
Chinese Navy
Among coast guard–like entities, it is natural and proper to consider how roles and
missions, not to mention resources, are allocated between coast guard forces, on the one
hand, and navies, on the other. Sea-power theorist Geoffrey Till explains that although
overlap is inevitable and logical, there is a spectrum of coast guard models, entailing
different kinds of relationships with national navies. Till observes, “With the widening
of the concept of security, accelerated perhaps by the events of 11 September, the extent
Photo 15. A buoy tender of the MSA operates in close proximity to two PLA Navy vessels.
Maintaining aids to navigation along China’s busy coasts is a major mission of the MSA. (China
Defense Forum)
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of potential overlap is increasing in ways which raise issues over who should be responsible for what.” As he further explains, some countries have navies and coast guards with
dramatically separate tasks, while in other countries (often smaller or less developed
ones) the navies themselves have functioned essentially as coast guards, active principally
in coastal patrol, management, and search and rescue missions.108
Chinese analysts have duly noted that some coast guards, including the USCG, have been
critically involved in national security. One Chinese maritime analyst, for example, notes
that Japan’s powerful coast guard serves as a vital reserve force for the Japanese navy.109
As the authors of the Ningbo Academy study observe, “The United States explicitly calls
its Coast Guard one of the five armed services, many times employing it for combat missions.”110 The same analysts are quite candid in projecting an important role for China’s
coast guard entities in any future military conflict: “In wartime, under the command of
the navy, [China’s coast guard elements] would escort maritime transport, would assist
in controlling maritime transport and also with amphibious ships, execute antisubmarine missions, protect ports, secure wharves, provide crews for some portion of the
navy’s fleet and assist in completing national mobilization.”111
An expert analyst from China’s National Defense University argued in June 2009 that
large Chinese coast guard cutters could be easily converted for use in far-seas combat,
while small- and medium-sized coast guard vessels could support coastal defense,
undertaking such missions as laying defensive minefields.112 Captain Moreland likewise suggests, “Both China Coast Guard and the U.S. Coast Guard are maritime armed
forces that lie outside their countries’ respective defense departments or ministries, but
are available to them for waging war.”113 It is, accordingly, perhaps not surprising to
see elements of the Chinese maritime enforcement community taking a hard line on
sovereignty and maritime claims issues: “Taiwan is in most respects still dominated by
a few foreign powers. . . . [F]rom this perspective, Taiwan island forms the strategic core
deciding the future fate of the Chinese nation. . . . On the sea, there are many neighboring countries that have island and ocean territorial disputes with China. These contradictions are relatively extensive, and this has a major impact on room for maneuver in
Chinese politics, foreign policy and military affairs.”114
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to see China’s developing coast guard entities as
simple adjuncts to the PLA Navy. A cosmopolitan outlook is strongly evident in the
Ningbo Academy study: “The initiation of armed conflict[,] or even limited war, would
severely impact the whole region and international system, and does not conform to the
nation’s circumstances of development.”115 Moreover, the Ningbo Academy is part of
the BCD, one of a few armed elements among China’s coast guard entities; one might
logically presume the unarmed elements (e.g., the powerful MSA) to be less inclined to
quasi-military activities. Also evident in the Ningbo Academy study is a sense that coast
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guard entities may actually be in competition with the Chinese navy for resources. These
scholars, for example, observe with evident frustration that “internally, many scholars
believe that maritime power means maritime military power, and maritime military
power means the navy.”116
A crucial question arises as to what the disposition of the Chinese navy, and the PLA
more generally, will be toward improving maritime enforcement capabilities. Preliminary evidence, in the form of an article in the June 2008 issue of the official and
prestigious 中国军事科学 (China Military Science), suggests that the PLA will support
this endeavor; its author, from the Chinese National Defense University, emphatically
calls for stronger maritime enforcement capabilities as a crucial component of a new
Chinese maritime strategy.117 In July 2009, a significant search and rescue exercise was
undertaken in the vicinity of the Pearl River Delta. The co-organizers were the PLAN’s
South Sea Fleet and the Guangdong provincial government. Thirteen agencies, twentyfive vessels, and two helicopters took part in the exercise, which was termed a “立体军
警民” (three-dimensional—that is, military, coast guard, and civilian) exercise. A Navy
Photo 16. In July 2009, the first-ever major search and rescue exercise involving significant naval
units and civil maritime entities (twenty-five vessels and thirteen agencies) reportedly took place
in the Pearl River Delta of southern China. (Modern Navy)

publication describing the exercise notes that China has set up a new and robust search
and rescue system but laments that the military regions are not well integrated into that
structure—a problem suggesting the need for further such exercises.118
Reconsidering Till’s two alternative models—wide bifurcation or extensive overlap—it
is worth noting that China has clearly emerged from the latter tradition. For much of
the Cold War, its navy was not much more than an elaborate coast guard. Today, more
bifurcation is occurring as China’s navy emphasizes technology-intensive warfare. Nonetheless, the PLA is also increasingly interested in issues that have often concerned coast
guards, including search and rescue, environmental protection, and piracy, suggesting
that a strict bifurcation of roles is simply not practical for China in the near or medium
term.119
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Explaining the Weakness of China’s Maritime Enforcement Capabilities
This study has given priority to offering an objective and detailed rendering of the
current statuses of various Chinese coast guard entities, primarily because no such
rendering yet exists in the English language. Still, it is important to lay a foundation for
explaining the central phenomenon at issue: China’s relative weakness in coast guard
capacities. Three related explanations are examined below: modernization processes,
economic issues, and finally, institutional structural issues. No doubt these differPhoto 17. China Rescue and Salvage Bureau of the MSA accepted ent explanations have
two Eurocopter EC225s into service in 2007. Further development complex linkages; for
of aviation forces by China’s civil maritime agencies appears to be
example, economic and
a priority. (China Defense Forum)
institutional structural
issues are clearly results
of modernization processes. Still, there is value
in focusing on different
segments of the various
causal links.
A recent and extremely
helpful article by Richard
Suttmeier titled “China,
Safety, and the Management of Risks” explains
that conventional wisdom posits a strong relationship between modernity and safety.
He writes, “The wealth and power expected from ‘modernization’ have long been seen
in China—and elsewhere—as risk-reducing, safety-enhancing developments.”120 Wealth
and education can bring about China’s “sixth modernization”—enabling Beijing “to
manage environmental and technological risk.”121 Suttmeier’s analysis looks at the
example of civil aviation in China, suggesting that “China’s performance on safety issues
. . . attracted and maintained high-level political and managerial attention . . . which
permitted the introduction of redundancy.”122 The essential argument here, then, is that
China’s coast guard entities could not function effectively until China became a modern society; until then, it simply lacked the wherewithal. Besides, many other demands
took precedence, not least economic and political survival—which, at certain points
during the “Century of Humiliation” and the Cold War, could not be taken for granted.
Having secured China from existential threats and moved it out of poverty, Beijing can
now turn to such previously second-order priorities as effective maritime governance
and even the relatively new concept of valuing individual lives. However, Suttmeier does
ask the provocative question of whether the “sixth modernization” can proceed without
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further political liberalization that would support “transparency in China’s risk management strategies” by empowering “activist civil organizations that have autonomy and . . .
resources.”123
An alternative explanation that prioritizes economic factors in particular may be more
amenable to Beijing’s current mode of thinking. Suttmeier calls for a “science-based
regulatory regime that is also sensitive to market forces.”124 He explains: “China needs
multiple mechanisms of risk management and governance that address the incentives
and disincentives operating on individual economic decision-makers.”125 According to
this view, order in China’s coastal waters is simply a requirement of the rapidly developing coastal economy. Powerful corporate entities are demanding the orderly management of ports and the safe, reliable passage of ships (and of the goods they carry).
Maritime disasters like the Dashun ferry tragedy in 1999 injured not only the victims
and national pride but also business as well, and it reflected poorly on Chinese technical quality and organizational efficiency. The safety-and-security culture in China may
flow from corporate entities outward. Suttmeier highlights the important contributions
of increasingly sophisticated Chinese insurance markets;126 coast guard improvements
may be seen as a new form of insurance for the massive investments made in China’s
maritime trade.
A final explanation has been a recurrent theme of this paper and is the central theme of
the important Ningbo Academy study of 2007—that the balkanization of maritime enforcement entities in China has severely inhibited the coherent development of Chinese
coast guard entities.127 The dragons duplicate one another in certain functions, fail to
Photo 18. Two small cutters from the MSA (foreground and right), are shown berthed across
from a cutter from the FLEC. There is some coordination among Chinese civil maritime
authorities, but it is also clear that Chinese maritime analysts perceive some problems in getting
the disparate agencies involved to work in concert to serve China’s maritime interests. (China
Defense Forum)
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coordinate effectively in others, and are individually too weak to achieve fundamental
breakthroughs in maritime governance—for example, in long-range search and rescue.
Suttmeier addresses this problem, noting that “responsibility for regulation is often
fragmented with the result that no one agency in the central government has control.
. . . Effective coordination among central government agencies, and between the central
government and local governments, has long been recognized as a key problem of governance in a rapidly changing China.”128 Indeed, a considerable problem within China’s
coast guard entities (for example, the MSA) is that local entities are often more powerful than the center in terms of resources, a situation promoting further balkanization,
inconsistency, and incoherence.129
In sum, modernization and economic explanations give considerable reason for optimism. Nevertheless, coast guard modernization in China is likely to continue to be
slowed by failures related to a lack, first, of entities in civil society charged with keeping
Chinese maritime governance structures honest, and also, more important, of a pervasive disunity of effort.

A Case Study in Cooperative Maritime Security
Notwithstanding that most coast guards have intricate and special relationships with
the naval forces of their nations, they are uniquely positioned to spearhead a cooperative maritime security agenda. This is because coast guards confront a panoply
of challenges of concern to all states with maritime interests. Indeed, many of those
challenges cannot
Photo 19. Captain Bernard Moreland, former U.S. Coast Guard
liaison officer posted to the U.S. embassy in Beijing, participates in a
be met without
professional dialogue with members of the China Coast Guard during
robust international
a visit to their academy in Ningbo. The designation of an O6 level
billet by the U.S. Coast Guard to the Beijing embassy is a signal of
cooperation. In that
Washington’s desire to enhance bilateral maritime cooperation. (USCG
light, it is instrucOfficial Photo)
tive to consider the
cooperation between
the U.S. Coast
Guard and Chinese
coast guard entities
that has blossomed
over the last decade,
while navy-tonavy contacts have
remained rather
limited.
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Photo 20. Coast Guard Vice Admiral Charles
D. Wurster, serving then as Pacific Area
Commander, presents Director-General Chen
Aiping of the China MSA with a commemorative
plaque honoring the U.S. Coast Guard and China
MSA on 4 April 2008 in Alameda, California.
The USCG and China MSA have engaged in
quite extensive exchanges and other forms of
cooperation. (USCG Official Photo)

Search and rescue cooperation has been
quite successful—an achievement that can
be measured in lives saved. In 2007, the
USCG’s Amver reporting system, which
assists in rescue coordination across the
globe by exchanging data on participating vessels near ships in distress, proved
crucial to major rescues of Chinese sailors
on two occasions. In March, Unicorn Ace,
with a crew of nineteen Chinese citizens,
sank in the South China Sea. The Hong
Kong Rescue Service, querying the USCG
Amver system, identified and vectored in
a nearby freighter, which rescued eleven of
the crew. Even more dramatically, in July
the vessel Haitong 7, crewed by twentytwo Chinese nationals and carrying lumber from New Guinea to Dalian, was caught
in a typhoon three hundred miles northwest of Guam and sank; the survivors were

Photo 21. The crew from the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Boutwell trains with the China
Coast Guard in Shanghai during August 2007. Boutwell visited China as U.S. Coast Guard
representatives for the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum. This forum was developed to increase
international maritime safety and security in the North Pacific and has evolved to become the
most developed international organization focused on maritime security in the vital East Asian
region. (U.S. Coast Guard photo)
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Photo 22. The 378-foot Coast Guard Cutter Rush, homeported in Honolulu, Hawaii, arrives
in Shanghai on 1 November 2009. The crew of Rush was in China to engage in maritime
partnerships and cultural exchanges. The U.S. Coast Guard has built significant goodwill
with Chinese maritime agencies, potentially building the basis for a more extensive maritime
partnership between the United States and China. (USCG Official Photo)

scattered across a thousand miles of ocean. Again, merchant vessels alerted by the Amver
system were crucial to the rescue, as were two U.S. Navy P-3 aircraft and two USCG
cutters. American rescuers coordinated closely with Chinese rescue authorities, receiving
from them information that aided the rescue plan. Thirteen of the Chinese sailors were
eventually saved. Few aspects of maritime cooperation can be so powerfully symbolic for
building vital trust and cooperation as mutual aid to sailors in distress.130
Another area of fruitful cooperation has been in the area of high-seas fisheries. In
particular, the USCG and the Chinese FLEC have developed a major innovation to help
enforce a United Nations General Assembly resolution prohibiting drift net fishing on
the high seas. Their approach involves the temporary posting of FLEC officials aboard
U.S. cutters patrolling the North Pacific. For example, a FLEC “ship rider” boarded
the USCGC Boutwell (WHEC 719) in August 2007. In one notable case, a fishing boat
suspected of using drift nets initially claimed Chinese registry and refused to submit to
an inspection by a Boutwell boarding team. The FLEC ship rider, however, had both the
jurisdiction and skills to inspect the vessel and detain the ship. The FLEC then sortied Yu
Zheng 118 from Yantai on a long journey to rendezvous with Boutwell and take custody
of the offending vessel and crew. This pattern was repeated six more times in 2007, during which process “international enforcement cooperation resulted as the mechanisms
finally fell into place for exchanging operational intelligence and plans.”131 One can quite
easily imagine a wide spectrum of similar environmental initiatives that would benefit
from creative U.S.-China cooperation, including many in the maritime dimension.
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Photo 23. Chinese coast guard cadets drill aboard USCG cutter Eagle in the Atlantic during
August 2009. Second Lieutenant Dun Mao, from Changsha in Hunan Province, of the Chinese
Public Security Marine Police Academy, gets help from classmates to don a survival suit. The
four Chinese cadets and one officer spent three weeks in America, training with different Coast
Guard units. In 2010, cadets from the U.S. Coast Guard Academy are scheduled to go to China
to train with its Public Security Marine Police Academy. (USCG Official Photo)

Yet another vital area of maritime cooperation concerns port security and flag-state
rights. China has been a leading player in the Container Security Initiative (CSI), an effort to ensure that the huge numbers of containers entering U.S. ports each year cannot
be used to transport terrorists or, in the worst case, a weapon of mass destruction. Teams
of USCG experts frequently visit Chinese ports to discuss requirements and exchange
security practices. Reciprocal visits are made to American ports by delegations from
the Chinese Ministry of Transportation. USCG personnel are also frequent visitors to
Chinese shipyards, as they must certify repairs made on U.S.-flagged vessels. Similarly,
the China Classification Society now maintains offices in the United States and visits
American ports to inspect Chinese-flag vessels.132 Given the huge amount of U.S.-China
shipborne commerce, it is perhaps not surprising that this form of maritime cooperation is both broad and deep, entailing the regular posting of each country’s officials in
the major ports of the other. It is well worth considering how this practical, grassroots
cooperation might serve the larger cause of maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region.
While the progress in bilateral coast guard cooperation is impressive, there are nevertheless real constraints and challenges that inhibit further expansion of the relationship. Most obviously, there are the coordination difficulties that result from the fact
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that there there is no single counterpart for the USCG on the Chinese side but rather a
group of often-competing institutions. An additional major problem concerns USCG
resources, since the organization is not primarily tasked with conducting international
engagement. Moreover, the small resources that the USCG does have for international
activities tend to be absorbed by initiatives related to the global war on terror. A third
complication is that the two nations have somewhat different priorities when it comes
to maritime governance: Washington has prioritized the counterterrorism mission since
the 9/11 attacks, but Beijing continues to give first place to sovereignty issues. Nevertheless, the USCG has led the way in developing U.S.-China maritime cooperation,
by “look[ing] for areas where China wants what the United States wants. Negotiating
how to execute a mutual interest takes far less resources than an adversarial negotiation to find a middle ground.”133 Contrary to conventional wisdom, moreover, it is quite
possible that cooperation between American and Chinese law-enforcement entities
could actually increase Beijing’s respect for human-rights norms.134 One high-value
program for the Chinese Maritime Police has arisen from the willingness of the USCG
to allow Chinese trainees into its Cadet Summer Program. Chinese students are still not
able to attend the full U.S. Coast Guard Academy course, but such exchanges should
be expanded further and reciprocated with American students in Chinese maritime
enforcement institutions. Faculty exchanges could also help in this important area of
bilateral cooperation. Given the clear priority of international cooperation in the new
U.S. maritime strategy, the leadership of the U.S. Navy would do well to study the recent
USCG experience with China to see how enhanced cooperation could serve the larger
cause of Asia-Pacific maritime security.135

Future Prospects and Strategic Implications
The 2007 Ningbo Academy study, discussed at length in this analysis, forms an important window into the current thinking and evident frustration of those charged with
contemporary Chinese maritime governance. The authors of that study make a strong
case that “our current maritime law enforcement forces . . . are not commensurate with
our status and image as a great power. . . . Unification of maritime enforcement agencies
would strengthen our flexibility in maritime conflicts[,] . . . exert pressure on Taiwan
separatists . . . and would not damage the nation’s strategic opportunity at the beginning
of the twenty-first century.”136
Still, the solution of unifying the various maritime enforcement dragons seems to
remain largely theoretical at this point. The MSA, largest of the maritime enforcement
agencies by far, could be a logical leader, but others have promoted the SOA because of
its broader strategic vision. There is little clarity regarding the way forward.137 Even the
BCD authors of the Ningbo Academy study ask pointedly, “Who will lead?”138
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Photo 24. Nanhai Jiu 113 of the Rescue and Salvage Bureau of the MSA will serve off the coast
of southern China and is one of several new vessels that the MSA has developed in the last
decade. (China Defense Forum)

At least three possible strategic implications can be drawn from the foregoing analysis.
Most obviously, stronger Chinese coast guard entities will no doubt serve to strengthen
China’s extensive maritime claims. More and better ships and aircraft at Beijing’s
disposal will likely increase its confidence in maritime disputes with its neighbors. As
stated clearly in the Ningbo Academy study, China will continue to “build up its military
maritime power, developing the power to safeguard its national territorial and maritime
rights and interests.”139 Yet there is also the practical consideration that “relying on the
navy . . . makes it easier for certain other countries to use the excuse of ‘the China threat
theory.’”140
A second major implication is that stronger Chinese coast guard entities are likely to
give further impetus to China’s rapidly growing “soft power” both in the Asia-Pacific
and around the globe. Thus, in June 2008, the Ningbo Academy hosted a maritime law
enforcement workshop for forty-two senior maritime officials from Asia and Africa.141
Such activities are likely to grow in size and scope in future decades, ultimately reaching
a level more in line with China’s major role in international maritime commerce.142 No
doubt, rescuing sailors from foreign (and often neighboring) nations helps to burnish
China’s emerging prestige in the arena of maritime safety and security.143
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Photo 25. Fisheries Law Enforcement Command vessel 311 exercises with other FLEC vessels.
FLEC 311 is China’s largest fisheries management vessel and was dispatched to patrol the South
China Sea when tensions arose in the area during mid-2009. It is expected that the FLEC will
receive additional large cutters in the near future. FLEC 311 served formerly with the PLA Navy.
(China Defense Forum)

A third strategic implication may be even more important—that coast guards represent
a distinctively different form of power than do navies. As explained by the authors of the
Ningbo Academy study, “Naturally, in the course of the struggle for national interests,
contradictions are inevitable. The real question is what means are used to settle these
disputes. Giving full play to the government’s capabilities, deploying the navy cautiously
and strenuously trying to limit the conflict’s scope to among the civil maritime authorities, can avoid a resort to escalation of the crisis.”
Thus, the Ningbo coauthors articulate a vision of coast guards serving as a kind buffer
between states in crisis, forestalling the intensification of crises that can result from
rapid naval deployments. Similarly, a Chinese military analyst wrote in June 2008 that
coast guard involvement would not complicate crises in the same way that direct navy
involvement might.144 Geoffrey Till also makes this point in his classic treatise on contemporary sea power: “Coastguard ships are often more acceptable politically. . . . [T]he
involvement of grey-painted warships is often seen as unhelpfully escalatory.”145 To be
sure, this is an encouraging line of reasoning. The same Chinese analysts also highlight
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Deng Xiaoping’s prescription to “maintain sovereignty, but shelve rivalry, and pursue
joint development.” For them, Deng’s formulation represents a new way for China to act
as a responsible great power that seeks peaceful resolution of maritime disputes.146 Such
reasoning and stronger and more coherent Chinese coast guard capabilities generally
make more feasible the realization of China’s emergence as a “responsible maritime
stakeholder” in the twenty-first century.
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Abbreviations and Definitions

A
B
C
E
F
G
M
P
R
S
U

AIS

Automatic Identification System

Amver

Automated Mutual-Assistance Vessel Rescue (system)

BCD

Border Control Department

CSI

Container Security Initiative

CMS

China Maritime Surveillance

EEZ

exclusive economic zone

FLEC

Fisheries Law Enforcement Command

GAC

General Administration of Customs

MSA

Maritime Safety Administration

PLA

People’s Liberation Army

PRC

People’s Republic of China

RCC

Rescue Coordination Center

ROK

Republic of Korea

SOA

State Oceanographic Administration

USCG

U.S. Coast Guard
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